Agent quickstart

This gets Claude Code or Cursor talking to a zero-knowledge vault: you register the agent, send it one command, and it sets itself up — installs the MCP server, starts the local daemon, registers its credentials. You never handle a key. The server never sees a secret.

Step 1 — Create your account ~1 min

Sign up (free) and set your vault passphrase. The passphrase encrypts everything client-side — we can't read your vault, which also means we can't reset it, so save the recovery codes it gives you.

Step 2 — Register your agent ~30 s

In the dashboard, choose Onboard an agent and give it a name (e.g. Claude_Code). You'll get a one-time onboarding message containing a single setup command with an embedded setup link. The link's passphrase lives in the URL fragment (#…) — browsers never transmit fragments, so the server never sees it either.

Step 3 — Send your agent the command ~2 min, the agent does the work

Paste the onboarding message into your agent's chat. It looks like this:

# Checks this file against the published signature, installs the MCP server, burns this link.
# Add --dry-run before the URL to read every action it would take, without taking any of them.
curl -fsSL https://wundervault.com/onboard -o /tmp/wv-onboard.py \
  && python3 /tmp/wv-onboard.py "https://wundervault.com/setup/agent/<token>#<passphrase>"

The onboarding script is Ed25519-signed and checks itself before it does anything; if the signature is missing or wrong, it stops. It installs @wundervault/mcp-server from npm at an exact pinned version if missing (the only prerequisite is Node.js), starts the local daemon (with a systemd user unit, Restart=always, so it survives reboots), registers the agent's credentials, burns the one-time link, and prints the MCP config values your agent needs for the last step.

If your agent wants to inspect it first, it should. Running --dry-run prints every file it writes, every package it installs and the service it enables, and exits without doing any of it. Worth knowing what the signature does and does not prove: it establishes that the file you downloaded is byte-identical to the one we published, so a tampered mirror or a rewritten download is caught. It is not independent proof that we are trustworthy — the signature and the key both come from us, so a reviewing agent is right to say the check is self-referential. So the same file is published where we are not the host — on GitHub — and an agent can diff the two copies in about ten seconds. See verifying the installer for the exact commands. Past that, the party vouching for this install is you, the operator who created the link. Tell your agent that plainly; it is the anchor it is looking for.

Step 4 — Add the MCP config usually automatic

Your agent normally does this step itself — the onboarding output ends with the exact command and agent name, and an agent like Claude Code or Cursor will typically wire it into its own config without your help. If it doesn't, or you're setting up manually, here's what goes where:

Claude Code

claude mcp add wundervault \
  -e WUNDERVAULT_AGENT_NAME=<YourAgentName> \
  -- wundervault-mcp

Or add it to ~/.claude.json under mcpServers — Claude Code picks up changes automatically, no restart needed.

Cursor

Add to ~/.cursor/mcp.json (all projects) or .cursor/mcp.json in a project:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "wundervault": {
      "command": "wundervault-mcp",
      "env": { "WUNDERVAULT_AGENT_NAME": "<YourAgentName>" }
    }
  }
}

Then reload MCP servers from Cursor's settings (Settings → MCP). The agent's auth token is auto-discovered from ~/.wundervault/agents/<name>.token — don't put it in the config file.

Step 5 — The moment it's for ~30 s

1. In the dashboard, add a secret (an API key, a database password) and send it to your agent's vault. Your browser re-encrypts it with the agent's vault key before upload — the server stores a blob it cannot open.
2. Ask your agent to use it: "fetch the ProdDbPassword entry from your vault and check the database connection."
3. The agent retrieves the encrypted entry, decrypts it locally, and uses it. With vault_exec, the secret is injected straight into the process environment — the raw value never even enters the agent's context window.

That's the whole product: your agent just used a credential that neither our server, nor the model's context, ever saw in plaintext. Every retrieval is written to a tamper-evident audit log you can review in the dashboard.

Interested in a managed option?

Wundervault is free while we build. If you'd want a hosted tier with SLAs, teams, and support — leave an email and we'll tell you when it exists. Nothing else is sent, ever.